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When it comes to improving tax revenues in developing countries, we do not have a
clear understanding of whether it is more important to have democracy or state
effectiveness. Two theories have prevailed in the literature; one is to focus on
building strong states that can have financial autonomy, the other is to promote
democracy with the assumption that democracy brings about economic growth. Yet
for over four decades developing countries’ tax to GDP ratio is still desperately low.
On average, developing countries ‘tax to the GDP ratio is less that half that of the
OCDE countries. This article contends that greater taxation outcomes result from the
synergistic combination between democracy and state effectiveness. Empirical evidence
from a time-series-cross-sectional dataset covering up to 120 countries during the 20032012 time period supports the conclusion that two attributes working together increase
tax revenue by 16% because they force political leaders to focus on citizens by improving
their political participation (democracy) and by meeting voters’ basic needs
(performance).
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PRICE OF FREEDOM: IMPROVING DOMESTIC REVENUES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY COMBINING DEMOCRACY WITH STATE
EFFECTIVENESS.

“The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may
prepare—all this and more is written in its fiscal history” (Schumpeter [1918] 1954: 7).

INTRODUCTION
When it comes to improving the overall domestic tax revenue in developing
countries, is it more important to have a democratic or an effective state? Do democracy
and state effectiveness in combination synergistically produce greater tax return than
either one of these political attributes acting alone? One of the main goals of democracy
promoters in developing countries is to improve political freedom along with the
improvement of domestic public finances. The underlying assumption of this goal being
public finances will increase following the improvement of civil rights and liberties in
developing countries. Recently, reliable measures of democracy have indicated that
democracy has made great strides specifically in the developing world. The remaining
question is the following: has taxation improved after a progress of democracy in
developing countries?
Efforts to raise domestic revenues in developing countries in order to finance
public goods have met with a long list of constraints, some political others structural.
Researchers and democratic activists alike have pointed to –among others – the lack of
democracy, historical, geographical, or other socio cultural factors and have gone to a
great length to find a solution to surmount these obstacles. However, despite applying

these solutions, the need to increase domestic revenue in developing countries remains a
constant concern. In addition, public finance recovery is still desperately low. According
to Baungard and Keen (2010), these internal revenue authorities recover – at best– no
more than 30 cents for every dollar spent in developing countries. More importantly,
these developing countries raise on average less than half of what OECD countries
collect in tax to GDP. According to Helen Ehrahrt, developing countries have an average
of 12.5% of tax to GDP compared to 28% in OECD countries in the years 1990-2005.
While there are a host of unanswered questions about how democracy would impact
positively public finances in developing countries, this paper hones on just one: Under
what conditions could the recent democratic improvement in developing countries bring
about an increase in tax to GDP i.e, domestic revenue?
The motivation is twofold. First, even though the relationships between
democracy and taxation have been of interest for well over two centuries, we are still not
completely sure about how improvements of Freedom House scores translate to greater
tax compliance. Second, exploring the impact of state effectiveness and its synergistic
association with democracy is a worthwhile academic endeavor. The insight is that
strengthening state effectiveness through performance and trust building between tax
authorities and citizens improves citizens’ tax compliance and tax collection. Yet, despite
numerous studies on the relationship between taxation and democracy, we do not have a
clear cut answer to the aforementioned question probably because the interdependence
between democracy and state effectiveness has remained unexplored. Thus, it is fair to
assume that the relationship between democracy and taxation in the developing world
seems less clear empirically and has been less well examined.

This article argues that greater tax revenue (tax compliance and tax collection) is
the outcome of the complementarity between democracy and state effectiveness working
in tandem. Without an effective state, there can be no efficient taxation. This point, of
course, is by no means novel. Several scholars of democracy and state building have
called attention to the role of the state in the recent years (Tilly, 1975; O’Donnell, 1986;
Prezworski, 1990; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rose and Shin, 2001). What we would like to
add to the literature is to provide an empirical substantiation to the theory explaining how
democracy, combined with state effectiveness, increases citizens’ trust in state legitimacy
to extract revenues.
Expectations
Exploring the relationship between democracy, state effectiveness and taxation,
this study uses a sample of 120 countries (developed and developing) over the course of a
decade (2003-2012). We find that the impact of democracy on taxation differs depending
on whether the country is developing or developed (here, OECD members) after holding
constant other variables such as the states’ regulatory ability, their capacity to control for
corruption, and their GDP per capita. Whereas democracy has a strong positive impact on
taxation in OECD countries, it has virtually none to a negative effect on taxation in
developing countries. On the other hand, state effectiveness has a very small effect on
taxation across all units, OECD and developing countries alike. Yet, the major finding of
this paper is that when state effectiveness is coupled with democracy, the combined effect
increases the tax to GDP by 16% in developing countries. We call “Effective democracy”
the interaction variable generated by combining democracy and state effectiveness.

This paper is organized as follows: the first section clarifies the meaning of
concepts used in this study by providing specific definitions of democracy, state
effectiveness and taxation. It also highlights briefly the importance and the recent trends
of taxation in both developed and developing countries. The next section succinctly
summarizes the extant theoretical and empirical literature connecting democracy to
taxation. The third section constructs the main argument of the article, which is built on
the works of Seymour Lipset’s, Jonathan K.Hanson’s, Shaoguang Wang’s notions of
state effectiveness. The fourth section provides a design and an empirical substantiation
of

the theoretical

propositions made in the argument.

The final section offers a

discussion followed by concluding notes. Additional information can be found in the
appendix.

I. DEFINITIONS

OF

DEMOCRACY,

STATE

EFFECTIVENESS,

AND

TAXATION
a) Definition of Democracy and State Effectiveness: Both democracy and state
effectiveness are multidimensional in nature. While recognizing this complexity,
this study seeks to define these concepts in a manner that is not only generalizable
but also captures the essence of the object under consideration. Starting with
democracy, we follow the two-dimensional definition put forth by Robert Dahl
(1971): contestation and inclusiveness. The first dimension refers to participation
or more precisely the rights for virtually all adults to vote and contest for an
office. The latter refers to the opposition’s rights, or creating institutionalized
channels for a meaningful opposition by those who are adversely affected by

government’s policies (quoted in Hanson p.4).

These two dimensions of

democracy, rightly captured by Freedom House’s measures, have notably
increased the recent four decades in developing world (see Freedom House “
Freedom in the World Report” 1973- 2010).

Like democracy, the concept of state effectiveness conveys different meanings
depending on whether one refers to it as a legal, fiscal, military, welfare or administrative
concept. Also, state effectiveness has been also widely used in economics, sociology,
strategic and political science literature. This paper follows Lipset’s definition of state
effectiveness and measures it with the index created by the World Bank’s World
Governance Indicators (hereafter W.G.I). Lipset defines state effectiveness as the actual
performance of government, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic function as
most of its population and such powerful within it as business or army forces see it
(p.65). Measured by the World Governance Indicators, Measured by the World
Governance Indicators, state effectiveness captures the perception of the quality of public

services and the degree of state effectiveness from political pressure, quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government commitment to
such policies (W.G.I Methodology p.4). Wang enumerates those public services that an
effective state performs to be: defining a political community that has citizens’ loyalty;
protecting basic civil rights and liberties; cultivating trust between institutions, power
holders and ordinary citizens; creating and maintaining a rule-based politics; vitalizing
the civil society, and meeting people’s basic demands (p.7).
Definition and Importance of Taxation: The World Bank defines taxes as “unrequited
compulsory payments collected primarily by the central government” (World Bank 1988:
79). These imperative payments are distinct from other revenue sources including debts,
entrepreneurial income, and user fees, in terms of obligations and administrative
requirements (Lieberman, 2002 p.92). For Lorenz Von Stein, taxation represents both
people’s civic duty and the state’s organizational ability to provide collective goods:
Taxes are conceptually entirely different from all other public revenue… Taxes
can be said to represent the nation’s entire civic sense on the economic plane….
In administering public property, the State is an independent economic agent with
its own capital; fees and regalia represent a payment to the State in return for
services rendered to individuals for the satisfaction of their individual needs.
Taxation, by contrast, represents a field in national economic life where, by virtue
of the State’s constitution and administration, part of the individuals’ economic
income is withdrawn from them and becomes the community’s economic
income… (Von Stein [1885] 1964: 28)
Taxes have played three key roles the state-society relationship: taxes have been used as a
device for state building, a solution for collective action problems underlying the
provision of public goods, and a tool for distributive justice. These three dimensions of
taxation are crucial in sustaining mature democracies and improving new ones. First,

from a practical point of view, tax extraction has been vital to the existence and the
strength of states throughout history.

To highlight this cardinal role of taxation,

Lieberman (2002) uses the analogy of food. Revenues gathered from taxes are like
nutrients for our body; if the state ceases to extract revenues it ceases to exist (p.92).
Second, as a solution to collective action problems, not only does taxation help to finance
public goods but also it vitalizes the social contract between governors and governed. By
imposing a mandatory pecuniary contribution from citizens, revenue body gives to
citizens the moral basis to hold the revenue body accountable, hence creating a “fiscal
contract”. In other words, compliance to taxation provides citizens a genesis for their
rights and responsibility to monitor the public funds. Cameron G Thies (2007) adds that
this fiscal contract produces a democratic relation between states and citizens because
theses peaceful transactions (i.e., bargaining) become necessary to avoid coercive forms
of revenues (these practices are considered incompatible with long-term democratic
behavior (Rakner, p. 9).

In short, as Rakner points out bargaining has contributed to

build institutional capacity and political legitimacy in order to generate revenues from
citizens in the Western democracies (p.3). Third, taxation is a political and financial
device that performs a distributive justice function. As Guyer maintains, the collection
and distribution of tax revenue implicitly or explicitly implicates policymaking in a
society made up of individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds (Guyer,
1992).
Tax Trends in Recent Years
When it comes to tax burden, the total fiscal effort as a share of the GDP, developing
countries have paid around 1/3 of what OECD countries pay. Nonetheless, in general,

taxation has increased in both regions taking the average OECD tax to GDP from 24.3%
to 31.5% (Ross, 2002) while the non OECD countries’ average tax burden jump from
14.4% to 18.9% of the GDP. On the other hand, East Asian countries were more reluctant
to raise their taxes than those in Latin American countries and Sub Saharan Africa.
Although developing countries had lower taxes already in 1970s, Ross maintains that the
oil booms contributed in plummeting the tax to GDP ratio in oil producing countries
(Ross 2002, p.14.). .) Recently, authors such as Helene Ehrahrt contend that from the
period 1990 -2005, the average tax to GDP in developing countries dropped to about 10%
compared with the figure of 27% for the OECD countries.

Table 1:
Regions

Tax Trends in the World 1970s- 2012
Average of Tax to GDP in Years
1970s-1999

2000- 2012

OECD countries

24.3% to 31.5%

28.9%

Developing Countries

14 % - 18%

10%

Colonial Legacy and Taxation in Developing Countries
Based on data from the International Monetary Funds, developing countries have a lower
direct tax rate compared to OECD countries. Scholars attribute this low tax revenue to a
broken taxation culture in developing countries, which is arguably rooted in the following
causes: colonialist legacy, post-independence nationalist ideologies, institutional

weakness, international aid and the actual political unwillingness to apply tax law.
Specifically in Africa, taxation traces its roots to colonization, like many other aspects of
the continent’s political culture. Some scholars associate the negative African view of
taxation with the continent’s colonial legacy. Colonial powers extracted tax revenues
using fairly brutal means in developing countries (Guyer 1992 p.43). Consequently, at
the times of independence, populist leaders, inspired by nationalist ideologies, associated
taxation with colonial rules. Guyer explains that at independence, taxation systems set up
by colonial governments were dismantled by the new populist authorities, which lead to
both the waning of state revenues and the weakening of states’ nascent institutions. In
addition, to gain more popularity from their citizens, some politicians banned taxation
altogether (p.56). As a consequence, a host of issues followed as consequences of
shrinking revenues. . In addition, to gain more popularity from their citizens, some
politicians banned taxation altogether (p.56). A host of issues followed as consequences
of shrinking revenues.
Moreover, this brutal colonial revenue extraction sowed the seed of states’ lack of
legitimacy in the newly independent countries. Pierre Englobert (2000) highlights this
aspect in his article “Pre-Colonial institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic
Development in Tropical Africa.” He argues that since the new ruling class inherited the
state from its former colonizers, rather than engaging in shaping it from within, they limit
themselves at exploiting countries resource using similar tools as the colonizers. Hence,
in developing countries, the state lacks legitimacy from the beginning. The state was not
the result of a social contract or formed to reduce transaction costs. Instead, as Kasfir puts

it, “from colonizers to new ruling classes, the state has been and continues to be an
instrument used to appropriate resources, a sort of “fountain of privilege” (1983p.123)
Detrimental implications of this lack of social contract and state’s legitimacy in
developing countries include the pervasive distrust of governing bodies and the absence
of a capable opposition. Opposition in such states did not form around particular policies,
but around challenges to the government itself or even the very existence of the state. As
a result, the rulers consolidated power by resorting to neo-patrimonial policies that
enhanced their personal power through corruption, nepotism and clientelism at the
expense of weakening state institutions (Englobert p.131).

Another negative

characteristic of tax culture in developing countries is the strategic choice that political
leaders make by willingly and unfairly exempting some sections of the population seen as
electorally important (Englobert 2000 p.134).

Rakner and Gloppen highlight this

phenomenon in Africa where, “the lack of political ability or political willingness to fully
apply tax laws with full force to groups perceived as electorally important (p.19). Given
this detrimental legacy of colonialism in developing countries, what can be done in order
to improve citizens’ contribution to public finance? Let’s search a possible answer in the
extant literature.
II. DEMOCRACY AND TAXATION IN THE LITERATURE
Since the late 1960s, the relationship between democracy and taxation in
developed and developing countries has figured prominently in several cross-national
studies published in political science journals and books (Downs, 1960; DeSchweinitz,
1964; Levi 1988; Prezworski, Haggard, 1990; Peters, 1991; Steinmo, 1993, 1998;
Chaudhry, 1997; Cheibub, 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Ross, 2002, 2006; Herb 2005;

Timmons, 2010; Ehrhart, 2012 etc..). This corpus of cross-national studies shows a
theoretical disagreement among scholars about the impact of the type of regime on
taxation or the effects of taxation on the type of representation. These diverging stances
match only with the ambiguous empirical results leading the reader to an inconclusive
consensus. Rather than recapitulate that vast literature, we focus on one single aspect of
the relationship - namely- the extent to which democracy brings about an improvement of
domestic revenues in developing countries. The progress in statistical software and
econometrics techniques, combined with the large availability of data, has enabled
scholars to conduct empirically sophisticated studies on the relationship between
democracy and taxation in developing countries. Yet, the findings of these studies lack a
consensus and span a continuum of a strongly positive relationship, a weak to no
relationship, and a negative relationship. For convenience and simplicity we group the
extant literature in three groups: the first group consists of scholars who claim that
democracy induces a greater taxation (DeSchweinitz, 1964; Levi 1988; Steinmo, 1993,
1998;Cheibub, 1998); the second group that argues exactly the opposite, contending that
democracy does not produce a successful taxation; instead, authoritarian regimes are
better than democracy in improving internal revenues (Downs, 1960; Haggard, 1990;
Prezworski, 1990; McGuire and Olson, Finlay,1996).

The last group sees no

relationships, or at bests a very weak one, between democracy and taxation (Meltzer,
1981; Profita et.al, 2009).
The gist of the first argument is better stated by Margaret Levi (1988).
Democracy delivers greater taxation because it reduces the cost of the collective action
problem through the mechanism of a collective bargaining and quasi-voluntary

compliance. For Levi, this quasi compliance affects the level of taxation because it
minimizes the cost compliance and collection (1988). Particularly, democracy is more
efficient in increasing taxation due to its single ability to provide the two pillars of quasicompliance: the perception that there is a bargain and the existence of insurance that
government will keep its side of the bargain (quoted in Cheibub. p.356). Emphasizing on
citizens’ control and monitoring over public spending in democratic regime, Cheibub
notes that the incentive to raise and spend is greater in democracy because “democracy
serves as an ideal benchmark in the sense that government are assumed to be perfect
agents of the citizens [the principle].

Thus, in democratic regimes, citizens decide

through some kinds of voting mechanism about the size of the government and have the
right to the fiscal residuum” (p.356). Elsewhere, supporters of “democracy promotes
better taxation hypothesis” argue that democracies can limit state intervention in the
economy and are more responsive to public demands on areas such as education, justice,
and health; thus they encourage citizens to willingly participate in the funding of public
goods (Doucouliagos et. al, 2008).
Opponents of the “democracy impacts taxation positively hypothesis” reject the
premises above. Stephen Haggard indicates at least three reasons that make authoritarian
regimes have greater incentive to increase taxation. First they use force to resolve
collective action problems. Second, they are free from any citizen monitoring processes.
Third, dictators do not lend themselves to any kind of popular approval or rejection.
Olson and McGuire (1991) contend that dictatorships are obliged to continually raise
public revenues to fund their insatiable pattern of wasteful and unchecked spending.
Haggard corroborating with Olson and McGuire states:

Since authoritarian political arrangements give political elites autonomy from
distributionist pressures, they increase the government's ability to extract
resources, provide public goods, and impose the short-term costs associated with
efficient economic adjustment. Weak legislatures that limit the representative role
of parties, the corporatist organization of interest groups, and recourse to coercion
in the face of resistance should all expand governments' freedom to maneuver on
economic policy (quoted in Cheibub p.354).
However, the proponents of the argument “authoritarian regimes produce better taxation”
fail to clarify how does the ability to use force is translated into a higher capacity to
implement specific tax policies. Also, as Cheibub demonstrates, to some extent, dictators
are not immune from popular approval or discontent. Thus, the so-called autonomous
attitude of authoritarian regimes is relative (p.358). Secondly, as for the argument about
the sequence for political development, the author presents democracy and state
effectiveness to be mutually exclusive. The purpose of this paper is to show that these
two analytically distinct political attributes can work together synergistically to create an
effective democratic state capable of raising better taxation in developing countries.
Yet, there are scholars who claim that the relationship between democracy and
taxation is insignificant.

For these authors, there is simply not enough empirical

evidence to conclude one way or the other that democracy leads to taxation. For Meltzer
and Richard (1981) it is impossible to predict if democracy or autocracy will lead to a
bigger government size, and more progressive form of distribution. Similarly, Profeta et
al. (2009) do not find any significant within-country effect of democracy and civil
liberties on neither corporate indirect taxes nor social security contributions. Finally,
authors such as Michelle D’Arcy (2012) point to the reverse of sequence in political

development stages between state building and democracy in developing countries.
For her, democratic regimes in developing countries give rights to citizens, who
do not reciprocate by performing their civic duties. This weakens the government’s
ability to extract revenue from citizens
Collectively, these earlier efforts to identify and, in some cases, gauge the impact
of democracy on taxation have considerably increased the visibility and relevance of the
topic in the political economy subfield. Altogether, there is no doubt the previous authors
deserve credits for undertaking research about the relationship between democracy and
taxation in the developing world. Nonetheless, all of them sidestep the explanation of the
tandem between state effectiveness and democracy to increase countries’ tax to GDP
ratio. Especially, from the perspective of understanding democracy and state
effectiveness as two analytically separate political attributes and their respective impacts
on taxation across countries in the developing world, each of the above approaches has
shortcomings. In general, these efforts tend to:
a. Include state effectiveness into democracy by using it as an embedded
dimension of a democratic state; this leads to the neglect of state effectiveness
that builds trust between citizens and democratic institutions through
substantive performance and enhanced credibility.
b. View the two concepts as two mutually exclusive entities in the sequence of
political development in developing countries;
c. Confuse strong states with authoritarian ones;
d. Use metrics and methods that ignore the dynamicity of both democracy and
effectiveness.

The present study corrects these shortcomings by proposing a theoretical argument
substantiated by robust empirical evidence.
III. THEORY
The major claim of this paper is that democracy and state effectiveness work
better synergistically to improve taxation than either one of these factors acting alone. For
a greater taxation, each of these two factors relies on the other in order to fully realize its
potential. In this relationship, democracy supplies the motivation for power holders to
deliver public service while state effectiveness provides the means (Hanson p.6). The
underlying sub-argument is that citizens will show increased tax compliance because not
only does government officials act substantively to sustain its credibility but also, in so
doing, it expands its own legitimacy to extract revenues. When citizens see their tax
authority as trustworthy and benefit from its performance, their willingness to act by “do
their parts” increases. They become true citizens who have rights through democracy,
have their basic needs met from their government’s substantive performances, and take
on their civic duties by complying to tax policies (Torgler et. al, 2002).
The interplay between democracy and state effectiveness can be better
understood when we compare tax compliance outcomes in developed countries to that of
developing countries. The combination of democracy and state effectiveness results into
a greater taxation in the OECD countries. The explanation follows the framework of
“democracy brings economic growth theory” better articulated by Lake and Baum
(2001): in a democratic system, a ready supply of alternative rulers and low costs of
political participation induce rulers to commit close to the socially optimal level of
spending on public resources. Similarly, democracy is claimed to facilitate the flow of

information and enables the formation of groups that can demand social services (Sen,
1999; McGuire 2010). Put simply, political leaders work to build a trust relationship
between government and citizens, and government performs its duties. Wang enumerates
these duties of state effectiveness to be the following: defining a political community
that has a citizens’ loyalty; protecting basic civil rights and liberties; cultivating trust
between institutions, power holders and ordinary citizens; creating and maintaining a
rule-based politics; vitalizing the civil society, and meeting people’s basic demands
(p.19-34).
Conversely, where democracy and state effectiveness do not work together,
resources spent on building state legitimacy through public services are wasted due to
institutional weakness or sheer lack of political incentives from power holders. That is, in
the absence of institutions that can perform effectively, democratic processes – elections,
recruitment of the executive and allocation of public goods tend to slide into a gigantic
clientelistic network. Alternatively, in situations where states display sufficient material
capacity but put no political pressure on rulers, public goods that were supposed to be
delivered to the masses stay circumscribed to a coterie of power holders (Hanson p.7).
Both situations – the lack of substantive performances and that of political incentive–
result into the loss of perception that the government is credible and legitimate, even if
democratic indicators are positive. In sum, the citizen feel abandoned for having to deal
with numerous negative consequence of an ineffective state. As Wang puts it:
Where governments lack adequate regulative capacity [state effectiveness], again
whether democratic or not, people there typically have to put up with frequent
industrial accidents and environmental disasters, untreated water, broken draining
system, chaotic traffic, appalling work conditions, tense labor-management
relations, shoddy consumer products, horrendous medical services, and the like.
The contrast between the two types of countries clearly points to the significance

of the state effectiveness (p.16).
This situation raises the question whether democracy is good for the poor. Bueno de
Mesquita and Michael Ross have given some explanation as to why democracy has not
delivered in poor countries. For Ross (2006), the great majority of poor people in
developing countries lack the political power to hold rulers accountable. Instead, political
competitions bind rulers only to the small urban middle class. Bueno de Mesquita (2003)
finds that it is not the level of democracy per se that determines the level of spending
allocated to the public goods but the size of the coalition on which rulers depend for
remaining in power.
To summarize the argument, when democracy is combined with state
effectiveness, the combination leads to a greater taxation because democracy provides the
motivation for a political leader to build a political community while state effectiveness
increases citizens’ trust in the system and its legitimacy, resulting to greater tax
compliance. To test empirically this proposition, I generate the following hypothesis:
When democracy works in tandem with state effectiveness, the synergistic
combination leads to a substantial increase in tax to GDP ratio in developing countries.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
To evidence the above theoretical formulation, I use the quantitative analysis with
the following design: My units of analysis consists of developing countries spread over
the six continents, with a number of cases N=120. The period covered in this research
start from 2003 to 2012. The dependent variable is country’s tax to GDP ratio, and the
main independent variable is the interaction variable that combines countries’ level of
democracy as measured by Freedom House and state effectiveness as measured by the

World Governance indicators (W.G.I). The alternative variables are democracy and state
effectiveness acting individually. The control variables include countries’ GDP per
capita, control of corruption, and their regulatory ability.
Economic and tax-related data (countries’ tax to GDP ratio) come from the World
Bank dataset. They cover the decade from 2003 to 2012.

Likewise, countries’

governance effectiveness, state regulatory capacity and control of corruption data are
drawn from the World Bank Governance Indicator dataset. Democracy measurement is
taken from Freedom House website. The time span chosen in this article refers to the
period seen in the literature as the post democratic transition in developing countries.
Variable Operationalization
The dependent variable is the countries tax to GDP ratio. The most important step
in the construction of taxation as an indicator is the process of selecting and justifying
which streams of revenue should be included and which should not. According to
Lieberman, “these choices are based upon assumptions about incidence (who pays) and
theoretically informed insights regarding what types of social and political dynamics
affect revenue outcomes”(p.95). In choosing the tax to GDP ratio, we select the totality
of each country’s ability to collect revenues. Widely used by most political economists
and other scholars involved in political and developmental studies, this indicator is
constructed and interpreted as representing each society’ overall fiscal effort, size, and
capacity.
As Lieberman asserts, the choice of any kind of revenues comes with its
advantages and negative consequences. The selection of the tax to GDP implies that
incidence is much less important than the overall burden on society as a single, collective

actor. We put an emphasis on

the tax burden felt by the public as taxpayers.

Furthermore, this choice entails that taxpayers react to tax burden according to the Mill’s
Hypothesis in order to produce the political result hypothesized (see Index). Admittedly,
some scholars prefer the direct tax, seen as the purest form. However, given the
complications of measuring tax incidence, the choice to use total tax collections may be a
reasonable strategy (Cheibub 1998 p.106). Finally, we choose the tax to GDP ratio as the
principal dependent variable because it correlates positively with civil liberties and
political rights.
a) The independent variable: Interaction between democracy and effectiveness.
b )Alternative variables: democracy and effectiveness acting individually.
The measure of the first alternative variable, democracy, in this article is each country’s
freedom score based on Freedom House’s measure of democracy. Because we borrow
the concept of freedom status from Freedom Houses’ nomenclature, we follow its
definition. Freedom status is the score obtained after averaging each country’s rating of
political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House p.3). In its 2012 report of Freedom in
the world, Freedom House uses three broad categories of freedom status to classify
countries: Free, Partly free and Not Free. According to Freedom House, a Free country is
one where there is open political competitions, a climate of respect for civil liberties,
significant independent civic life and independent media. Such a country’s freedom status
rating will be between 2 and 4. A Partly Free country is one in which there is limited
respect for political rights and civil liberties with the freedom score between 6 and 8.
Additionally, Partly Free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption,
weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single

party enjoys dominance despite a certain degree of pluralism. Finally, Not Free countries,
where the freedom score ranges from 9 to 14, are those in which basic political rights are
absent and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied.

We also follow

Freedom House’s increasing order and recode democracy in two categories: 1 = Free; 2 =
Not Free.
The choice for Freedom House score is rooted in the fact its indexes capture
political rights and civil liberties seen as the two overarching dimensions of democracy
that has increased in the developing world. Freedom House contends that political rights
enable people to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for
public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have
a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate (Freedom
House).

As a consequent, the dimension of political rights is divided into three sub

dimensions of the electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and the
functioning of government. As for the civil liberties dimension, it encompasses freedom
of expression and belief, association and organizational rights, the rule of law, and
personal autonomy and individual rights. These two components of the freedom score
remind the reader of what the taxpayer receives upon demanding for more
accountabilities and responsiveness.
Admittedly, critics have voiced that most of these sub-dimensions are slanted
toward more classical liberal principles.

Scholars such as Schneider and Schmitter

(2004) contend that Freedom House overloads the concept of democracy with a host of
characteristics that are all in one way or another related to democracy but are really facets
of political liberalism, social justice, and security, which should not be confused with

democracy as a characteristics of the political process. For them the distinction is crucial
in that democracy is about holding the government accountable to citizens, while liberal
principles aim at decreasing the arbitrary encroachment of government—no matter how
accountable it may be — in people’s private lives. In fact, they see the tenets of classical
liberalism as precondition of democracy. A second criticism leveled at Freedom House’s
measurement is that it equates administrative efficiency with democracy. However, real
life experience shows democracies’ capacity to make and enforce decision may even be
worse than that of dictatorships, where fewer actors are given opportunity to oppose or
debate policies.

As a result Freedom House’s critics (Schneider and Schmitter,

Przerworki to enumerate few) subscribe to the minimalist definition of democracy, which
emphasize the electoral competitiveness and accountability.
c) Control Variables: Countries’ GDP per capita, state regulatory quality, and control of
corruption.
i. The GDP per capita: The World Bank defines the GDP per capita as the gross
domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies
not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
Data are in current U.S. dollars (W.B).
ii. Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector
development (WGI).
iii. Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public

power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Each of these variables,
regulatory quality and control of corruption are index built by combining regulatory data
from Both the Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption are constructed by the
W.G.I The WGI are composite governance indicators based on 30 underlying data
sources. These data sources are rescaled and combined to create the six aggregate
indicators using a statistical methodology known as an unobserved components model.
A key feature of the methodology is that it generates margins of error for each
governance estimate. Originally, WGI reports its measures in two ways: in the standard
normal units of the governance indicator, ranging from around -2.5 to 2.5, and in
percentile rank terms ranging from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) among all countries
worldwide (WGI Methodology p.5). However, in order to gauge precisely the effects of
state effectiveness, we rescale the measurement to range between 1 and 3. 1 capturing the
value of weak state, 2 the value of moderately effective and 3 highly effective. The
summary of variables’ descriptive statistic is the table below:

Table 2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Obs

Means

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Tax

1181

17.411

7.8468

0.1

61

democracy

1199

1.2

0.4273

1

2

lngdp

1185

14169

18181

111.2

11.6458

Effectivedem

1115

3.4757

1.4046

0

5

Regulatory Q.

1200

0.2837

0.9318

-2.34

2

Control Corrup

1200

0.1874

1.0575

-2.5

2.5

Effectiveness

1115

1.973

.1875

1

3

METHODOLOGY
a) Time-series- cross-section models
The nature of the question under investigation and the structure of the data lead
us to use a Time-series- cross-section (T.S.C.S) models to measure the long term effects (
a decade from 2003 to 2012) of the interaction variable, “Effective democracy,” on
taxation. According to Nathanael Beck (2004), a time-series- cross-section data is one
type of repeated observation data that is commonly analyzed in political science and
related disciplines. T.S.C.S. data is common in the analysis of data where repeated
observations (often annual countries’ Freedom scores and effectiveness) are made on the
same fixed political units (usually states or countries’ tax to GDP ratio). Although the
linear equation of a T.S.C.S. model assumes that all units map the covariates into the
dependent variable identically, the way to drop this assumption and allow each unit to
have its own intercept is to add a term (ai) to the equation. This can be done by adding a
series of unit dummy variables to the specifications called `fixed effects' (Beck, 2004).
One consequence is the reduction of the degree of freedom. However, Neck contends that
with a reasonably large T (say over 10), fixed effects do not use up an absurd number of
degrees of freedom because as T gets bigger, we get better and better estimates of the
fixed effects. Furthermore, according to Trivedi and Cameron, the fixed effect (FE)
allows obtaining a consistent estimate of the marginal effect of the j th regressor. More
important, the estimates obtained are time varying even if the regressors are endogenous
(p.237). The fixed effect model is in the equation (1)
γ =α +βχ1t1 +βχ2t2 +βχ3t 3+βχ4t4+………+βχnt n.εIT (1)
Where γ represents the dependent variable the tax to GDP ratio on which we regress the

following independent variables χ1 to χ5

the lagged dependent variable, democracy,

state effectiveness, effective democracy( the interactive variable), the gdppercapital, the
control of corruption, and the regulatory quality. α represents the intercept and the βs
represent the coefficients of the parameters.
Another T.S.C.S.model that estimates individual effect is the random effect. In
the random effect model (RE), it is assumed that the intercept is purely random; a
stronger assumption implied that the random effect singled out is not correlated with the
regressors. Trivedi and Cameron indicate that one advantage of the (RE) model is that it
yields estimators of all coefficients and hence marginal effects, even those of invariant
regressors (p.255).

Like in the fixed effect model, whereas both democracy and

effectiveness did not appear to be statistically significant in the above model, effective
democracy, the interactive variable has not only a positive coefficient but it is statistically
significant as well.

Nonetheless, we base our analysis solely on the outputs of the fix

effect model because Trivedi and Cameron recommend that the (RE) model’ estimates
are inconsistent if the post estimation, (i.e., the goodness of fit) tests indicate that the (FE)
model is appropriate.
Yet with these results, comes the second challenge to modeling a T.S.C.S data—
namely— the issue of serial collinerarity caused by the dynamicity of time. In this case,
scholars indicate to include the lagged dependent variable (Hendry, Pagan and Sargan,
1984; Hendry and Mizon, 1978) to solve the serial collinearity challenge. Following this
recommendation, we lag the dependent variable for one year and test to see, if despite
this operation, the interaction variable still matters. The results indicate that effective
democracy remains a statistically significant upward driver of internal revenues in

developing countries. We complete the method section by using a Maximum Likelihood
Estimation model, which provides robust standard errors.
After recoding the variable taken from the WGI (state effectiveness,) to start at 0
as the minimal value and 3 as the maximal value, we measure the impact of the
interaction variable, “Effective democracy” on taxation using the three models, Fixed
effects (FE) in the first column, Random Effect (RE) in the second column, and the
Maximum (MLE) in the third one. The result table below displays each model’s outputs
(each variable’s coefficient, statistical significance, and standard errors).
Table 3: Results of the Three Models: (FE), (RE) and (MLE)
EMPIRICAL
Variables

RESULTS

Models
Fixed Effects
Coef.
P-val.

Std. E

Random Effects
Coef
P-val

Std.E

MLE
Coef

P-val

Std. E

.962

0.00

.009

.960

0.00

.010

.95

0.00

0.10

Effective
democracy

.161

0.00

.061

.155

0.00

0

.162

0.00

.058

democracy

-.195

0.30

.188

-.16

0.381

.185

-.20

0.294

.192

Effectiveness

.601

0.14

.380

.57

0.125

.373

.62

0.100

.382

Control corruption

.049

0.74

.151

.034

0.839

.149

.501

.643

.765

Gdp percapita

2.22

.622

3.52

2.72

5.52

5.5

2.67

631

5.5

Regulatory quality

-.079

0.61

.342

-.06

.694

.152

-.07

.543

.542

lagged tax

The log likelihood: -2173,9198

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As shown in the above table, across the three models, in developing countries,
democracy by itself has no effect on taxation; the P-Value is beyond the acceptable
threshold (0.005). For instance in the Fix Effect model, democracy’s P-value = 0.300,
RE democracy’s P-Value =0.381, and 0.294 for the MLE for despite the robust standard
errors.

This finding corroborates the section of the theory, which maintains that mere

increase in civil and political rights in developing countries is an insufficient condition to
improve taxation. Equally, state effectiveness is not statistically relevant ( P-value =
0.14) despite having a positive intercept. The insignificance of the state effectiveness
speaks to the institutional weakness and, or the lack of political willingness to
substantively perform and to meet citizens basic needs in most developing countries. As
for the control variables, the log gdp per capita, the control for corruption, and regulatory
quality, neither of these variables prove to decrease the positive impact of the primordial
independent variable: Effective democracy. The major finding of this investigation is that
the synergistic combination of democracy and state effectiveness increases substantially
tax revenue by 16% for both the FE model, and the MLE and 15% for the RE models.
After a conclusive Hausman test, confirming that the null hypothesis is non significant (
P-Value 0.023), we use the 16% as the final output in term of revenue increase when
democracy and state effectiveness work in tandem.
These results substantiate empirically the abundant scholarship on tax
compliance. They point to the fact that a responsive government enhances both tax
morale and tax compliance by increasing what Hetherington calls people’s evaluation of
government’s performance relative to their normative expectation of how it ought to

perform( p.13). A government that commits itself in building trust through effective
performance sends a strong signal to taxpayers that their demands have been taken into
account. As Christine Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) argues, the three components of trust
induced by democracy that influence taxpayers behavior and consequently the tax
capacity of the government are government’s legitimacy, i.e., citizens’ approval of the
government; government’s efficiency, which refers to whether or not the government
performance lives up to citizens’ expectations; and government’s credibility, which refers
to the predictability and durability of government’s actions (p.15).

VII. CONCLUSION
On the outset of this study, we aimed at demonstrating that when democracy and
state effectiveness work in tandem, the tax revenue increases because these two attributes
force political leaders to focus on citizens by improving their political participation
(democracy) and by meeting voters’ basic needs (performance).

State effectiveness

combined

calls

with

democracy

will

provide

what

Tilly(1975)

“

internal

homogenizations” (p.66) which entails the transformation of people’s commitment and
loyalty from smaller tribes, villages or petty principalities to a larger political system
creating a common national culture of loyalty and commitment to a political community.
In order words, this fundamental function will correct one of the most challenges in state
building

efforts highlighted in Joel Migdal’s States in Society(2001), the dispersed

loyalty of citizens in developing countries. , when citizens see their tax authority as
trustworthy and benefit from its performance, they are willing to contribute. They
become true citizens who have rights through democracy, benefit from the performances

of their government, and take on their civic duties by complying to tax policies. In
developing countries, the price of freedom is the investment required to establish a
citizen’s trust in her political community. How to build this trust though substantive
performance is an interesting topic for future researches.
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Appendix

Stata outputs on the three models.

